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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS (FOUO 5/79)

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CONTENTS PAGE

INTERNATIONAL

MOSCOW JOURNAL DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 3, 1979 signed to press 20 Feb 79 pp 16-21

[Article by V. Alenik: "Fruits of Good-Neighborly Policy: Soviet-Turkish Relations at the Current Stage"]

[Text] The strengthening of Soviet-Turkish ties since the 25th CPSU Congress is one proof of the success of the land of the soviets' foreign policy aimed at developing equal friendly relations with neighboring states regardless of their social system.

As is known, relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey have a rich and highly instructive past. The very geographical position of the two countries and their peoples' common interests in maintaining and strengthening peace and security in the region are factors conditioning the need to develop relations of friendship, good-neighborliness and mutually beneficial cooperation. And when forces which have no interest in such a development of Soviet-Turkish relations succeed in clouding them, it is precisely those forces which profit rather than the peoples of the two countries. It is no secret to anybody that the positive development of Soviet-Turkish relations does not suit western imperialist circles, since such development hinders the implementation of the North Atlantic bloc bosses' plans for using Turkey's military and economic potential and its territory against the Soviet Union. With good relations with the USSR those circles find it much more complicated to secure from Turkey restrictions of its sovereignty to the benefit of NATO interests and to encroach upon its right to an independent and self-sufficient foreign policy.

That talented and farsighted politician and creator of the Turkish republic, Kemal Ataturk, saw and understood well the imperialist nature of the West's policy toward Turkey. He clearly recognized the danger of that policy for Turkey. In the face of such danger, he noted, Turkish policy must be based on principles providing for a nationwide struggle by the entire Turkish people against imperialism, which is striving to destroy their national existence.[1]

The entente powers, K. Ataturk stressed in August 1920, in striving to insure for themselves continued possession of the east and the opportunity to exploit are attempting all out to destroy and crush us and, moreover, with their wealth and might, are attempting to hinder the Bolsheviks, who are accomplishing the liberation of all oppressed mankind and extending the hand of friendship to our oppressed nation.[2]

The events taking place in the near and Middle East region in our time testify to the topicality of those words even today. K. Ataturk also understood clearly that Turkey's security and independence and its economic development largely depend on the nature and level of relations with neighboring states, not least the Soviet Union. That is precisely why the idea of independence and the great benefit to Turkey of friendship and good-neighborly cooperation with our country runs through all his statements on Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union.

A substantial path has been covered in the development of Soviet-Turkish relations since Ataturk's time, despite a certain period of coolness to which they were subjected. In recent years particularly major changes have been observed in them, thanks to efforts undertaken by both sides.

L. I. Brezhnev stressed in his report at the 25th CPSU Congress that Soviet-Turkish cooperation "from the chiefly economic sphere is spreading gradually to economic questions also."[3]

The steady upward development observed recently in Soviet-Turkish relations has finally led to major changes in them. However, signs of such changes have been noted more or less clearly even before. The now traditional contacts and meetings between the two countries' leaders have played an invaluable role here. Back in 1967 a joint communique on the results of Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel's visit to the Soviet Union and the soviet leaders' talks with him stressed that "in relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey there are no questions that would lead to a clash of their fundamental interests."

The 1972 declaration "on the principles of good-neighborly relations between the USSR and Turkey" was an important landmark in the development of relations primarily in the political field. The document stressed the two countries' desire to develop ties and cooperation in accordance with the traditions of peace, friendship and good-neighborliness established by V. I. Lenin and K. Ataturk.

Ushering in extensive new opportunities for expanding all-round, mutually beneficial Soviet-Turkish cooperation based on mutual understanding and trust, the declaration at the same time exposed the falsity and unsoundness of assertions made by some circles both inside and outside Turkey casting doubt on the sincerity of the Soviet Union's Leninist course of developing genuinely good-neighborly relations with the Turkish republic. This document

eloquently testifies that Turkey can only see a readiness for friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation on the part of its northern neighbor. The sides mutually believe that the 1972 Soviet-Turkish declaration is an important document insuring the strengthening of good-neighborliness, mutual understanding, good will and cooperation. It fully accords with the main aims of the final act of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe and is acquiring new and broader significance in light of this document.[4] It is highly indicative that this lofty appraisal of the declaration was made by the two sides 5 years after its approval and publication.

The positive onward development of political, trade, economic, cultural and sports ties has naturally led to the need to introduce new elements into the two countries' relations which would stimulate the further expansion and deepening of cooperation, its spread to new areas and the establishment of this cooperation on a more durable and long-term legal basis. Appropriate accords to this effect were achieved by the two countries during the December 1975 official visit to Turkey by A. N. Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The sides' intention--enshrined in the joint communique--to prepare a political document on the principles of good-neighborly and friendly cooperation between the USSR and Turkey and to sign it in the immediate future at the next summit meeting was of great significance.

In accordance with the above accords on agreement on developing economic cooperation on a long-term basis, an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and an agreement on cooperation in preventing the hijacking of civilian aircraft were signed in March 1977 during Turkish Foreign Minister I.S. Caglayangil's visit to the Soviet Union. At the same time the sides affirmed their intention to prepare and sign a political document.

Economic ties, of which there are long-standing and good traditions, have played a substantial role in creating an atmosphere of good-neighborliness and friendship in Soviet-T[illegible]h relations. Back in the prewar years textile combines were constructed in the cities of Kayseri and Nazilli with Soviet technical and financial collaboration.

However, economic ties have gained really wide scope since an agreement on constructing a number of major industrial enterprises in Turkey with soviet collaboration was signed in March 1967. The commitments made by the soviet side under this agreement have been met in full. Such major industrial enterprises as the Iskenderun Metallurgical Combine, the Izmir Oil Refinery, the Seydishehir Aluminum Plant, the Bandirma Sulfuric Acid Plant and the Artvin Plant for producing woodpulp fiber boards have been constructed and commissioned in Turkey with soviet collaboration. Some other industrial enterprises and projects have also been constructed.

New agreements and contracts on cooperation in expanding the metallurgical combine, the aluminum plant and the oil refinery and also in constructing a

number of major new industrial enterprises in Turkey have recently been concluded between the Soviet Union and Turkey and are being successfully implemented.

The construction of a dam and reservoir on the Akhuryan (Arpa-Chai) border river--projects which will make it possible to irrigate large areas of land on both sides of the border--has been underway for several years now. A particular feature of that construction work is that the dam and reservoir not only are being constructed by combined efforts in a joint understanding [na payakh] but also will be the first jointly commissioned project and a symbol of good-neighborliness.

The redrawing of more than 600 km of the Soviet-Turkish land border, which was carried out in a spirit of complete mutual understanding, played a substantial role in creating, developing and strengthening the atmosphere of good-neighborliness in relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. The work of demarcating the Soviet-Turkish sea border and the border in the flooded section of the Akhuryan reservoir is currently proceeding successfully. Naturally, the existence of a stable, precisely plotted border between two neighboring states and the absence of any kind of claims on each other cannot but have a favorable effect on their political and other relations.

Contacts and ties along military lines are also developing. As is known, for a long time Turkish ruling circles dared not go against the NATO leadership's directives and held back from establishing similar ties with the Soviet Union. However, the growing sense of realism finally prevailed. Army general K. Evren, Turkish deputy chief of general staff, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union in spring 1976. N. G. Ogarkov, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of general staff of the Soviet armed forces, paid a visit to Turkey 2 years later. It is extremely important that the continuation and expansion of contacts and ties were advocated during the meetings and talks of the two countries' military commanders. General K. Evren, now Turkish Chief of General Staff, has been invited to pay a return visit to the Soviet Union.

In November-December 1978 warships exchanged visits for the first time in the history of Soviet-Turkish relations. A detachment of Soviet vessels visited the Port of Stamboul. "The Soviet vessels," the journal (YURYUYUSH) [as transliterated] wrote, "symbolize the USSR's peaceloving policy toward Turkey pursued since the first days of the October revolution." Turkish warships in turn visited Odessa for several days.

The aforementioned contacts have demonstrated the usefulness of extending good-neighborly relations to such spheres as the military sphere and have enabled the Turkish high command to see for itself that the Soviet army, standing guard over its people's peaceful labor, threatens nobody and, possessing as it does tremendous might, is an important factor in maintaining and strengthening international peace. The contacts along military

lines have contributed to further strengthening the belief among broad sections of the Turkish population that there is no danger to Turkey from the Soviet Union, despite the lying assertions of some Western circles.

The results of Turkish Prime Minister B. Ecevit's June 1978 official visit to the Soviet Union are evidence of the further strengthening and expansion of Soviet-Turkish relations and their filling with more weighty substance.

In Turkey itself, right up to the time the visit took place, an atmosphere favorable to the Soviet Union was created and this is accounted for by many reasons: Primarily recognition by the broadest sections of the Turkish public that the Soviet Union's efforts are beneficial in consolidating peace, security and cooperation for the peoples in the near and Middle East region and also understanding the sincerity and friendliness of soviet policy. It is indicative that a refusal to accept some false ideas and concepts has also been observed in Turkish ruling circles. This has been confirmed by official public statements that Turkey does not see a threat to itself from the Soviet Union and has no intention of being a NATO outpost and spearhead on its southeast flank. The increasingly loud voice of the progressive democratic movement in Turkey calling persistently for Turkey's more resolute departure from a prowestern orientation and for further rapprochement with the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries in all areas of relations has also been of important significance.

B. Ecevit's visit to the Soviet Union, his talks with L. I. Brezhnev and the fruitful talks in the Kremlin were of cardinal significance from the viewpoint of further developing relations between the two countries. Speaking at a dinner in honor of the distinguished Turkish guest, A. N. Kosygin stressed that the Turkish prime minister's visit continues and further develops the beneficial process of spreading Soviet-Turkish cooperation from the mainly economic sphere to include political questions. "Such a development," A. N. Kosygin noted, "is law-governed, since political relations as a rule become more durable and more stable through the expansion of practical, businesslike-like ties and contacts and they, in turn, have a stimulating effect on the course of economic and other cooperation among states."

The signing of the political document on the principles of good-neighborly and friendly cooperation between the USSR and Turkey as a result of the Moscow talks essentially marks the beginning of a higher stage in the development of Soviet-Turkish relations.

Embracing as it does virtually all areas of cooperation between the two neighboring states, the document sums up what was already achieved in the relations between our countries and it stipulates clearly the tasks, ways and trends of further stimulating and expanding cooperation in the foreseeable future. The document, whose content fully accords with the spirit and letter of the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, stresses primarily--and quite understandably--the political aspects of Soviet-Turkish relations. It is difficult to overrate the significance

of the sides determination enshrined in it to develop relations of good-neighborliness and cooperation on the basis of respect for each other's sovereignty, equality, way of life, social system and territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs. Mutual security and benefits and also their determination to maintain both countries' borders as borders of good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation. The sides' pledged carefully to observe the principles of nonuse of force or the threat of force in their mutual relations and also to refrain from allowing their territory to be used for committing aggression and subversive acts against other states are particularly meaningful. The document provides for cooperation between the sides in international organizations and conferences, the expansion of opinion exchanges and cooperation in deepening the process of detente and spreading it to all regions of the world and also in questions of disarmament and the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racial discrimination.

The part of the document relating to the development of economic, trade, scientific and technical cooperation and cultural, art, scientific and sports exchanges is also extremely important.

The overwhelming majority of the Turkish public has welcomed the results of the visit. Along with the political document, the signing of the Soviet-Turkish agreement on demarcating the continental shelf in the Black Sea and also the accord achieved in Moscow on further substantial expansion of trade and economic cooperation has caused great satisfaction in Turkey. The country's political opposition parties also gave a generally positive assessment to the visit and the Moscow talks--a fact which confirms that the course of developing and strengthening friendly, good-neighborly cooperation with the Soviet Union has most widespread support in Turkey.

The Turkish newspaper POLITIKA mounted a poll to elicit the attitude of the country's population to this visit and the development of cooperation with the USSR as a whole. Here are some of the comments made. Guner, a worker, said "we are gladdened by economic and political cooperation and positive mutual relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The peoples of Turkey and the Soviet Union want fraternity and friendship." Gunaydyn, a student, said "the visit is undoubtedly very important and useful to our people. We know that the Soviet Union helped our country during the National Liberation War without imposing any terms." Tuna, a housewife, said "I think that Ecevit's visit will be useful for developing relations between our country and the Soviet Union." Chakyr, an official, said "the tireless struggle waged by the Soviet Union to halt the arms race and insure peace and friendship among the peoples frustrates the plans of those engaged in instigating war in our region."

The broad positive reaction among all sections of Turkey's population to the results of the visit attests, above all, that a kind of profound psychological breakthrough has on the whole been accomplished in favor of the broad development and strengthening of multifaceted ties and cooperation with the

USSR. In other words, the conviction that the Soviet Union is Turkey's good neighbor and profitable partner has become the predominant conviction among the Turkish public.

Soviet-Turkish relations have recently been developing actively in accordance with the agreements reached. Suffice it to say that in the second half of 1978 alone six Turkish cabinet ministers paid business trips to the Soviet Union. For the first time in the history of Soviet-Turkish relations a 3-year trade agreement was signed in November which will insure severalfold growth in commodity turnover between the two countries in the period 1979-1981. As a result, trade will take its proper place in the complex of relations between the two countries.

The third session of the Soviet-Turkish Mixed Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation held in Moscow in October 1978 ended with positive results. It discussed questions of considerably enlarging a metallurgical and an aluminum plant and an oil refinery and constructing two large thermal electric power stations, a hydrogen peroxide plant and certain other enterprises, as well as cooperation in other sphres, including totally new ones.

Considerable progress has recently been noted in the development of cultural and sporting ties. Contacts in these spheres are being transformed increasingly actively into mutually advantageous cooperation which, in addition to the traditional exchange of artistes, figures in the arts and sciences and sportsmen, manifests itself in forms such as making a joint feature movie and inviting Soviet choreographers, conductors, sports coaches and so forth to work in Turkey.

Thus the policy aimed at developing friendship and good-neighborliness is benefiting the peoples of both Turkey and the Soviet Union. At the same time, despite the results achieved, there are broad unutilized opportunities for further strengthening mutually advantageous multifaceted cooperation and extending it to more new spheres. Success in realizing the above-mentioned opportunities largely depends on the mutual desire to further expand relations in the various directions envisaged in the political document. And careful and unserving fulfillment of the obligations imposed on each side in accordance with the provisions of that document assumes special significance in this context.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Ataturk, "Selected Speeches and Statements," "Progress" Publishing House, Moscow 1966, p 182.

2. Ibid., p 101.

3. Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress, Political Publishing House, 1976 p 15.

4. See PRAVDA, 19 March 1977.

CSO: 1800

INTERNATIONAL

SOVIET BOOK DEALS WITH U.S. SENATE, FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow AMERIKANSKIY SENAT I VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA (The American Senate and Foreign Policy) in Russian 1978 signed to press 13 Feb 78 pp 1-2, 232, 217-227

[Title, publication data, annotation, description, table of contents and conclusion from book by Ye. I. Popova]

[Text]

pp 1-2

"Amerikanskiy senat i vneshnyaya politika 1969-1974" [The American Senate and Foreign Policy, 1969-1974], Ye. I. Popova. Institute of the USA and Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences. Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," Moscow, 1978. Signed to press 13 February 1978, 4300 copies, 232 pp.

p 2

The book examines the role played by the U.S. Senate in the development of U.S. foreign policy in the late 1960's and early 1970's, when Washington began to reorganize its foreign-policy course as a result of the overall warming in the international climate. The book indicates the participation of the Senate in that reorganization, the struggle in Congress concerning such questions as arms limitation and the turning point in the relations with the USSR, the NATO crisis and methods of overcoming it, and the defeat in Vietnam and the search for new versions of a policy in Asia.

The book is intended for scientific workers, historians, and anyone with an interest in U.S. foreign policy.

p 232

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONCLUSION

In 1969-1974 the Senate exerted a substantial influence upon the formation of U.S. foreign policy. That influence followed basically three directions -- legislative activity, propaganda, and the development of a foreign-policy course on the basis of feedback, that is, the assimilation of the lessons provided by the preceding period and the consideration of the new situation, both within the country and throughout the world.

The Senate's legislative effect became more intensified in all areas of foreign policy, and that inevitably meant an invasion into the sphere of actions of the executive authority. That led to an expansion in the conflict between the two branches of authority, to the aggravation of the "Congress vs. the President" problem. Congress set definite limits to the president's powers in the field of foreign policy, in particular by the adoption in July 1973 of a special decision that limited the president's right to begin and to wage a war without Congressional sanction, and the Watergate scandal ended the struggle of the early 1970's with the complete defeat of R. Nixon.

The Senate's propaganda activities also increased. The foreign-policy discussions were accompanied by an appeal to the public. In the statements made by senators over television and in the press, and sometimes at Congressional meetings (for example, those against the Vietnam War), and in the agitational activities of various public organizations linked with various blocs in the Senate, propaganda battles were waged on questions involving relations with the USSR, the military budget, the Pentagon's influence, etc. In this struggle, all the groupings that were fighting one another attempted, with each grouping using its own methods, to raise Washington's shaken prestige in the country's public opinion.

As a result of the fact that the late 1960's and early 1970's were a period of Washington's re-examination of its foreign policy, there was an especially strong manifestation of that important Congressional function which official American historiography calls "representation of the interests of the people," but which the literature of the radical-critical trend calls representation of the interests of various groups of the bourgeoisie, and which could more correctly be defined as the function of feedback in the interests of protecting capitalism as a whole.

In executing this function, the Senate, in the course of its hearings and debates, ascertained those conditions which were unfavorable for American imperialism, and set down methods for adapting to the changing situation. That process did not go in a smooth or automatic manner. It evolved in the struggle of different versions of a foreign-policy course, which were backed up both by the interests of individual bourgeois groups, and also by the attempt to unit all the versions by the common task of adapting the foreign policy to the new ratio of world forces.

The increase in the role of Congress, which had previously been observed periodically in U.S. history, confirmed that parliamentarianism fulfills a function that is beneficial for capitalism, by participating in the re-examination and correction of the political course, and thus, from time to time, it acts as a deterrent on the tendency to the intensification of the executive authority. As in the past, the increase in the activity of the Senate and of Congress as a whole was closely linked with the upsurge of mass movements, by the heightening of the atmosphere of discontent, and by the fall in the country's authority on the international scene. All these phenomena pointed out the necessity to make definite changes in the country's foreign policy, and the Senate played the role of an important link in that reorganization, which occurred against a background of conditions that were changing to the detriment of imperialism.

The internal placement of the forces in the Senate was determined by the presence there of three groupings that have not been formalized, but which constantly sprang up there -- the conservatives, liberals, and moderates, the numbers of whom varied by years and depending upon the nature of the question being discussed. The foreign policy was re-examined in the struggle among these groupings, and discussions, with the weighing of

all the pros and cons, and that led to the development of an alternative foreign-policy course.

The conservatives, who in 1969-1974 counted in their ranks approximately 40 or, at times, somewhat more than 40, senators, predominantly Republicans and Southern Democrats, played the role of the defenders of the old course, supporting its successiveness. The grouping defended the slowest, and only the extremely necessary, adaptation to the new requirements of life, the minimal concessions to the idea of detente, to the moods of public opinion, and to the gradual course of the national-liberation movements. It usually prevailed in the Senate and forced its specific decisions upon it.

The liberals, the number of whom varied around the total of 30-35 (basically Northern Democrats), acted as critics of the obsolete policy of the Cold War, and spoke out in favor of a realistic recognition of the fact that the U.S. positions had been weakened; they demanded that attention be directed to the urgent necessity of improving the internal state of the "sick society," and to reinforce the foundations of the regime. In their specific proposals they were defeated more frequently than they were victorious, but after a definite amount of time had elapsed, those proposals found recognition and, albeit partially, were implemented in governmental policy. By playing this role of preliminary planners, the liberals, however, even in this function of theirs, manifested lack of consistency, and their class limitation. Their position was characterized by concessions to the rightists, by constant shiftings of various members of the grouping to the right, to the camp of the moderates. But nevertheless their critical statements violated the monopoly of the official views that had formed and contributed to the re-examination of the previous policy of inflexible imperialism.

The moderates most frequently avoided any platform statements or formulating of principles, preferring practical arguments in each specific instance and striving to find a "middle line" between the conservatives and the liberals. That was promoted by the indefiniteness of its boundaries, by its frequent division into the rightist moderates (the moderate conservatives) and the leftist moderates (the moderate liberals). However, its role was very substantial, inasmuch as the "middle line" proposed by it usually meant that very course that the government had adopted, and it is not by accident that one of the basic parameters pertaining to the moderates was their support of the president, which was shaken only by Watergate.

Thus, the Senate's activities reflected the fact that the U.S. ruling circles were not acting as a single, monolithic whole. Against a background of the transition "from confrontation to negotiations" there arose serious differences of opinion in questions concerning the relations with the USSR, the changing of methods as a result of the defeats suffered by the previous policy, and the priority of domestic needs. Events have shown that the

Senate is not a "do-nothing collection of speechifiers," a purely propaganda forum, but, instead, occupies a definite place in the mechanism of developing the country's foreign policy, by advancing and substantiating possible alternatives in that policy.

The alternatives in the foreign-policy course which were proposed in the Senate were of a rather stable nature.

The conservatives' program, at the basis of which lay the attempt, factually speaking, to preserve the Cold War, and the lack of desire to make any serious reconsideration of the old course. manifested itself as early as 1969 in connection with the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty, when 16 conservatives spoke out against the ratification of the treaty in general, and the majority of the remaining ones voted in favor of amendments concerning the opportunity for the United States to transfer nuclear arms to its NATO allies, to annul the treaty unilaterally, etc. In connection with the subsequent negotiations concerning arms limitation, the position of the rightists was characterized by their emphasis upon dragging out the agreement with the USSR, in forcing upon the USSR unjust terms which would assure the superiority of the United States. The 1972 Jackson Amendment, the acceleration of the Trident program in 1973, the approval of the appropriations for the latest MARV [Maneuvering Antiradar Vehicle] system, the attacks upon the Vladivostok Accord as being "unilaterally profitable for the Russians" -- all these reflected sufficiently clearly the interests of the military-industrial complex. The rightists' line is typified by the playing upon the chauvinistic emotions, incited by statements about "losing," "capitulation," "the conversion of the United States into a second-rate country," etc.

The policy proposed by the conservatives for Asia also had anti-Sovietism as its initial point. Rapprochement with China was justified by the hostile position of the Maoist leadership with respect to the USSR. Although the extreme rightists B. Goldwater, J. Buckley, R. Long, etc. continued to be afraid of "Red China," speaking out against its inclusion in the United Nations and in favor of retaining the reliance upon Taiwan, most of the conservatives became more and more firmly resolved in their hopes concerning the "coincidence of interests" with Peking. They defended until the last opportunity any direct military intervention in the countries of Indochina and supported all the appropriations for aggression in Vietnam, with the basic argument of the rightists being the "national interests" of the United States in SOutheast Asia, which were interpreted as the "containment of communism" and leadership in the "defense of the free world." When most of the conservatives, as early as 1973, were forced to agree to the banning of operations in Cambodia and Laos, as well as to the limitation of the president's military powers, the group of extreme conservatives still voted against those proposals; afterwards, some of the rightists put their hopes, albeit short-lived ones, upon the economic "aid" levers, which, it was proposed, could maintain the bourgeois, pro-American tendencies in the further development of the

countries of Indochina. The conservatives unanimously arose against any curtailment of the American troops deployed in the Asian region of the Pacific Ocean.

With regard to Europe, the conservatives took a course of overcoming the crisis of Atlantism with the aid of the complete reinforcement of NATO, which would have meant the actual continuation of the military confrontation with the Warsaw Pact countries and the dragging out of the Vienna negotiations, which would have been inevitable, inasmuch as it was proposed to conduct them from a "position of strength." The supremacy and administration of the United States in Europe was openly opposed in this conservative program to the influence of the USSR and was accompanied by a requirement of exerting pressure upon the allies with the aim of forcing them to increase their monetary contributions to the cause of "joint defense."

As a whole, it was a course aimed at the arms race, military pressure, and interference in the affairs of other countries, and aimed at leadership on the basis of force -- in the interests of defending and reinforcing the positions of American imperialism.

In principle, the liberals pursued the same final goal, defending, in the struggle against socialism, the bourgeois system and international leadership of the United States. However, they proposed operating with a greater consideration of the real-life ratio of world forces. They proposed acknowledging, in a number of instances, the insolvency of the methods of exerting direct military interference and dictates, and recommended proceeding from the inevitability of coexistence with socialist states. They spoke out against the idea of the "world policeman," feeling that that idea was beyond Washington's capabilities, although they did not reject the role of the United States as a "world leader." The determining factor in their position was not only the more sober evaluation of the placement of forces on the international scene, but also the attempt to resolve, in the interests of social stability, the most acute domestic problems, that is, the idea of the priority of domestic tasks, which idea had formed under the influence of the large-scale mass protest movements in the United States in the second half of the 1960's and the early 1970's.

A peculiarity of the liberal argumentation was the constant moralizing, the pacificistic phraseology, in which the United States was depicted as a traditionally peace-loving state, and the chief task of American foreign policy was declared to be its moral leadership, the salvation of mankind from nuclear catastrophe, etc.

An important place in the liberals' program was assigned to the problem of arms limitation, which problem was in the center of the reorganization of the international relations.

In 1969 the entire liberal grouping, except for two senators, supported the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty and voted in favor of its ratification without any stipulations or amendments. After organizing an active opposition to the expensive plans for the Sentinel and Safeguard antimissile defense systems, the liberals emphasized that the rejection of those systems, or at least their suspension, would be an incentive for achieving a state of accord with the USSR. The liberal grouping spoke out against the rightists' attempts to add onto the resolution concerning the ratification of the 1972 Moscow agreements certain amendments that confirmed the unequal approach to the further Soviet-American negotiations concerning strategic arms limitation, and the principle of American supremacy. That grouping expressed a positive attitude toward the 1974 Vladivostok Accord and, in a 17 January 1975 resolution proposed by E. Kennedy, W. Mondale, and C. Matthias, came out in favor of adopting at the Soviet-American negotiations the principle of equality in both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of armaments. The liberal alternative also included a certain reduction of the appropriations for various types of strategic weapons (Trident, B-1, etc.), and it was indicated that the forced development of arms was not only reducing the domestic social programs, but was also incompatible with detente. Moreover, it could not serve as a "trump card at the negotiations."

However, the liberals' opposition was not profound. Instead, it was purely verbal and did not go beyond the confines of changing the methods of conducting successful foreign policy. In defending the principle of equality at the negotiations with the USSR, the liberals advanced the idea of "reciprocal vulnerability," or "equilibrium of terror," which could not be a genuine basis for reducing armament. After suffering a defeat in their amendments to the appropriations for military programs, they usually voted unanimously for the military budget without those amendments, in its entire volume. Waging propaganda against the extreme manifestations of militarism and the excessive influence of the Pentagon, they acted in complete consolidarity with all the reactionary forces in "censuring" the Soviet actions involved in protecting the gains of socialism and the national-liberation movements.

The liberal alternative of the policy in Asia was also of a dual nature. It stipulated a positive attitude toward rapprochement with China -- with appeals for a gradual approach, caution, the development of chiefly economic ties, so as not to undermine the detente. Reacting to the profound domestic crisis caused by U.S. aggression in Vietnam, and expressing acute uneasiness as a result of the lack of promises in the war and the unreliability of putting one's hopes on the corrupt regimes in Indochina, the liberals developed the thesis that the United States do not have any major "strategic," "national" interests in that region or any circumstances for military intervention. Under the influence of the broad anti-Soviet movement in the country, they extended a campaign of criticizing the government's actions, made approximately 30 proposals concerning the de-escalation of the war, and achieved the adoption of a

resolution concerning the limitation of the president's military powers. Many of the liberals came out in favor of the reduction of the U.S. military presence in the Asian region as a whole (the 1974 discussion), although the question of the actual nonintervention or withdrawal was not posed: the subjects that were brought to the foreground were the economic methods, the reinforcement of the alliance with Japan, etc. The amendments introduced by the liberals were insignificant in nature and, as a rule, were rejected.

The policy in Europe which was proposed by the liberals differed from the conservatives' version in the requirement to reduce the U.S. military presence in that region. The liberals emphasized the danger of a confrontation that was capable, at any moment, to develop into a war; the necessity to take into consideration the increased weight of the European "center of power," and, in general, to overcome the numbness that was typical of the "Cold War knights"; the lack in Europe of any "threat to the national security of the United States"; and, finally, as in other questions, the priority of the domestic needs -- the opportunity, by reducing military expenses in Europe, to save approximately $1-1.5 billion and to reduce unemployment in the country by creating jobs not at foreign bases, but "right here at home."

Behind these arguments that were brought to the foreground by the liberals were such concrete, "business-like" motivations as references to the worsening state of the economy, especially the increase in inflation and the instability of the dollar because of the gold drain for foreign military expenses (the 1974 discussion was carried out during a period of increased economic crisis in the United States); the appeal for the reinforcement of the "political institutions" that had been undermined by the lack of resolution of the acute problems pertaining to the cities, education, poverty in the midst of abundance, which problems were causing mass discontent and threatening the social stability; and indications of the possibility of transferring a larger share of the burden of NATO expenses to U.S. allies.

Thus, the subject at hand was not some kind of profound re-examination of the fundamentals of the imperialistic policy of the United States in Europe, but only limitations evolving from the reduction in the proportion and influence of the United States. The demand to reduce military presence means not the renunciation of the reliance upon NATO as the chief bulwark in Europe, but only the reduction of the direct military dictate, with the expansion of military-economic cooperation with the allies (the "redistribution of the burden"). The liberals came out in favor of the continuation of negotiations with the Warsaw Pact countries that had been begun in Vienna, the rapid completion of which, incidentally, they were not counting on.

The lack of any profound, fundamental differences between the conservative program and the liberal one manifested itself in the minimal nature of

those practical steps which were advanced by the liberals. They proposed reducing only the "permanent, worldwide, ground-forces" military presence of the United States -- the most mobile air and naval forces were not affected. The requirement to reduce the American Army of 300,000 men in Europe became increasingly indecisive with every passing year: by 50 percent (1971), by 40 percent (1973), or by 25 percent (1974), with some of the liberals agreeing to the reduction only outside of Europe or only as a result of excess support services.

As a result, what was important was not so much the concrete proposals made by the liberals (especially since those proposals were usually not accepted by the Congress), as the overall approach embodied in them, the approach to a European policy that proclaimed a more realistic evaluation of the U.S. capabilities than the conservatives had made. That approach facilitated the implementation of the slogan "from confrontation to negotiations," and the statements that were directed against the excesses of the militaristic demands of the Pentagon, which had been building up people's fear of the mythical "Soviet threat," contributed to a certain restraining of the military-industrial complex, exerting a definite influence also upon public opinion both within the United States and outside its confines.

The moderates' alternative was characterized by the attempt to find a compromise solution between the necessity of adapting to the new conditions and the maintaining of the command positions of the United States, and hence, by a pragmatic approach to each concrete situation.

In the question of limiting strategic arms, the moderates' program was summed up as the recognition of the necessity of negotiations and, at the same time, the retention of all the Pentagon's military programs (although, unlike the conservatives' course, without their excessively forced development). The moderate senators voted in favor of the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty (seven with stipulations; ten without any conditions). During the ratification of the 1972 Provisional Agreement, a considerable number of them supported the Jackson Amendment, but many of the moderates attempted to weaken its formulation and voted against the Pentagon's demand, which was advanced as a condition for the "recognition" of the Moscow agreements, to appropriate additional amounts for the Trident, the B-1, and other "exotic systems." In connection with the further negotiations for strategic arms limitation (SALT-II), the moderates' position was characterized by statements concerning the "dramatic change in the world" which one would have to take into consideration, by the demand that the negotiations not be disrupted, by verbal consent to the principle of equality, and, simultaneously, by the attempt to haggle a bit more, using as the "trump card at the negotiations" the development of new military programs. The approval by the moderates of the accord that had been achieved in Vladivostok was accompanied by their vote in favor of accelerating underground tests. However, in all the instances that were mentioned, there was a manifestation of the tendency

on the part of the moderates to limit the Pentagon's appetites somewhat (the 1973 McIntyre Amendment against the acceleration of the Trident program; the attempt to postpone certain appropriations for a counterforce weapon in view of the possible attainment of agreement with the USSR in 1974).

In connection with questions of Asian and European policy, the moderate group expressed sufficiently clearly the goal of the maximum retention by the United States of its leading role in those regions, the continuation of interference in their internal affairs, speaking about the danger of falling into isolationism, of creating by U.S. withdrawal various vaccums which "would inevitably be filled by the USSR," as well as the "vital, long-term interests" of the United States both in Asia and in Europe. However, the moderate course differed from the conservative course by its greater flexibility and, in the face of foreign-policy defeats, stipulated certain departures from the previous global claims.

Rapprochement with Maoist China, which had begun at the beginning of the 1970's, was viewed by the moderates as a counterbalance to Soviet influence and the liberating struggle of the peoples of Indochina, but at the same time there was developed the idea of a "half-turn," of supporting a balance between the USSR and Chinese People's Republic (a "balanced policy"), unhurriedness in the carrying out of that course in general, particularly the preservation for a definite amount of time of "two Chinas" (although mention was also made of returning Taiwan to China in the future).

In Indochina the moderate position meant the attempt to drag out the de-escalation of the war so as to achieve, if not an "honorable peace," then at least the preservation of a support in South Vietnam. They hoped to achieve this not by an expansion of the military offensive (the moderates did not approve the extension of military actions to Cambodia and Laos; proposed, for the most part, the concentration only upon air actions; etc.), but by means of diplomatic negotiations in Paris or with the aid of the United Nations, the convoking of an Asian international conference. They allowed renunciation of direct military interference by the United States and the gradual reduction of the aid to puppet regimes, but only in the indefinite future. Thus, that course was reduced to the slogan, "leave, but not immediately," and only after reinforcing pro-American regimes as base points for the further U.S. policy in the Asian region.

After the final collapse in Vietnam, the moderate version retained the requirement for American military presence in Asia, but the tasks that were brought to the foreground were those pertaining to the European policy (especially in connection with the economic difficulties and the political crises of 1974). The moderate program with respect to Europe, having as its initial point the very same idea of the leading role of the United States, which was allegedly protecting "its security" overseas, included the nonconsent to any considerable reduction in the American

military forces or NATO, and only some of the moderate senators voted in 1974 for the reduction of 75,000 men, which was depicted as a "trump card at the negotiations" in Vienna, but the reconsideration of that position was considered to be possible when the Atlantic ties are reinforced.

All three foreign-policy courses that were proposed in the Senate in 1969-1974, as has been noted, were somewhat altered under the influence of events, but, with regard to their basic direction, remained stable: the conservatives gravitated toward a policy of the past, the liberals came forward as initiators of a tactical re-examination, and the moderates attempted in a pragmatic manner to unite both views, adapting to the current conditions. In the struggle among the alternatives, the U.S. position on the considered international questions was formed. That struggle was one of the essential factors that determined the fluctuations and zigzags in Washington's tactics. Without changing the imperialistic essence of the U.S. foreign policy, that struggle was nevertheless of importance, undermining the course of monopoly imperialism and revealing certain additional opportunities for the struggle waged by the progressive forces for the peaceful coexistence of states with opposing social systems.

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NATIONAL

SOVIET PEOPLE LIKE NOVEL ABOUT UKRAINIAN JEWS

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 2 Mar 79 p 3

[Interview with Anatoliy Rybakov, author of novel on Soviet Jews, "Heavy Sand," by Livio Zanotti]

[Text] Moscow. The season's literary event is, above all, political. The novel "Tjagelij pisok," which in Italian would sound like "Sabbia pesante" [Heavy Sand], is 200 pages long. It gets inside a Jewish saga in a northwest Ukrainian village from the beginning of the century to the Nazi occupation during World War II. This subject has been taboo in the Soviet Union. The author, Anatoliy Rybakov, 67, is himself a Jew. His real name is Aronov. However, he is unknown to most readers. He is a realist, a social reporter more than an investigator of the soul. He is also a solitary person, shy, in conflict with ambitions and disturbing ideas that are sometimes contradictory.

He participates passionately in the Jewishness of his characters, and he reaffirms their racial identity even before, if not against, the fact that they are Soviets. Nonetheless, some critics close to the "dissent" deny that he has the right to represent the traditions of Israel in Russia. They question his ability to do this, criticizing him for having allowed himself to be assimilated by the regime. They recall his remissive and comfortable coexistence with Stalinism. Furthermore, it was the magazine OKTIABR, old bulwark of Slavophile nationalism, that published "Heavy Sand." The magazine is anything but free of suspicions of anti-Semitism. However it is not just any publication. These are the reasons for the uproar caused by the novel, a best seller already sold out.

To borrow the three issues of the magazine with the Rybakov novel from the Lenin Library it is necessary to get on a list and wait for months before obtaining them. The black market price of the book at Kuznetskij is more than 20 times the cover price, 40 rubles, equivalent to almost 45,000 lire. For some classics, Bulgakov or Majakovskij, and the protagonists of the literary fringe, Okudjava, Baranskaja, Trifonov, this is normal. But this never happened to a well-alined author who was brought up in the shelter of the writer's union.

What makes hundreds of readers write to Rybakov? For weeks the mailman has been making two trips a day with a full sack at the attractive wooden dasha, in which he has lived for 15 years with is wife just outside Peredelkino, the village 25 kilometers from Moscow where Pasternak lived and is buried.

"Many [letters], but not all, are from Jews. They say different things: the pride of seeing testimony to the courage of the Jews in war after so many have told only about their resignation; curiosity about the characters of the novel which some consider autobiographical and therefore peopled with persons who really existed. Altogether, they are an expression of solidarity for the people who fight and suffer."

He is not tall but robust. He wears a heavy sweater to protect himself from the 20 degrees below zero during these days of Russian winter when the heating system does not entirely keep the cold out of the house. The writer sinks his hands into the boxes full of envelopes and scattered sheets of paper. He pulls some out randomly. He glances at the signatures that are by engineers, farmers, students, men and women, most of them from the western regions of the USSR.

True Story

[Question] How do you explain so much interest?

[Answer] I do not know. Perhaps because I have been the first to deal with a delicate and tragic story of this kind. Perhaps because there are many people who are waiting to recognize themselves by finding their own past.

[Question] What led you to write "Heavy Sand" and why now?

[Answer] The material is authentic. I simply reworked it. These Jews, who pass from the Czarist ghettos in the difficult years of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War--and found the strength to love each other and to live peacefully before taking up arms against the Nazis--are the relatives of an acquaintance. He told me about their joys and sacrifices, their nobility and weaknesses. I transferred all this into the town of my parents because I knew it well. In 3 years I wrote and rewrote. I had entitled it Rachel, the name of the main protagonist, then I preferred "Heavy Sand," recalling that in that part of the Ukraine the earth is soft and sandy, while for the Jews in my story it was so heavy that they were buried in it.

[Question] Is it by chance that you wrote it now?

[Answer] I thought it was the right time. There may have been other moments in the past and perhaps there will be others in the future. The idea, the need to do it, came to me now. I believe it was necessary. It is difficult for me to give any further explanation.

[Question] "Heavy Sand" has aroused interest, but also consternation. They say that its Jews are not always authentic. They say that you came to know them after having never met them for a long time.

[Answer] They say I won a Stalin prize...

[Question] Yes, they also say that.

[Answer] When I received the prize, we wrote about other things, the grand buildings, the great abnegations.... I had always worked as an engineer in the automobile transportation sector. I was among truck drivers and I described their lives. It was honest work. When they published them I was 40 years old. I felt that I was little more than a boy, with an entire life before me and all the time to do everything I may have desired. I began to write "Heavy Sand" more than 20 years later, with the wounds of war and diseased lungs that reminded me every day about my old age, and it was no longer life that was before me, but death. It is a time when one can no longer write just anything, to waste the little remaining energy. I decided to write the essentials of what I feel and what interests me.

[Question] The magazine you chose to publish it was also disoriented. The fame of OKTIABR contradicts what it appears the spirit of the novel was to be.

[Answer] I made no choice. In fact, another magazine, whose editor finally gave up on it, was supposed to publish it. So I went to OKTIABR. Its label as a conservative organ was well known to me. I had contributed to it years ago. But that reputation was made for it by Vsevolod Kocetov. The new editor, Aleksei Ananiev, wants to change it and I believe my novel helped him. I thank him very much. He has behaved with courage and dignity.

Racism

[Question] Who are these Jews in "Heavy Sand"?

[Answer] I still remember the old man who said to me: "We are Jews not because of the blood that flows in our veins but because of what spills out of our veins."

[Question] There are those who say that after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact the Soviet press began, for diplomatic reasons, very cautiously to give out information on the anti-Semitic policy of Hitler's Germany. The Jewish population of the USSR thus was supposed to have been caught in many cases unprepared for the Nazi invasion. What did the Soviet Jews know about the German race theories?

[Answer] I personally knew about them. When in 1933 Hitler seized power, our press explained what fascism, racism, Hitlerism was. We all knew it very

well. Certainly we could not imagine that the solution of the Jewish question for Hitler meant extermination, the uprooting of the entire people of Israel. Nobody could have imagined this, because it was beyond human imagination. The Jews, however, knew about racism, what it was. For this reason most of them evacuated toward the east as the armies of the Third Reich advanced. The protagonist of my novel, Rachel, was among those who did not want to believe it. She had been in Switzerland, had known the Germans; said they were a magnificent, civil, cultured nation; it could not be true that they would assassinate children and old people. She remained, inducing many others to stay with her; and she dies resisting in the ghetto--another victim of the illusion of the enlightenment.

[Question] Does Rachel, her husband Jacob, and their children have any political education?

[Answer] No, they are not party members--if that is the question. Neither am I. I wanted to write about a proud and courageous people, the Jewish people, of their feelings and national dignity, which do not prevent them from living peacefully with other people: Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Russians, live and die together with the Jews. I told about a people who, like all the others, has its saints and criminals, its honest and dishonest people. But since in every ghetto there was resistance--at Warsaw, at Minsk, at Vilnius--as a writer I believed I had the right to present my characters as undefeated men and women. We must affirm mutual respect among peoples and among individuals. "Heavy Sand" is intended to contribute to this.

[Question] Does a Jewish condition exist today in the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Personally, I do not feel it. In what sense do you mean?

[Question] But the Jews are not just any people anywhere in the world--because they are a people who are dispersed, who live therefore in a special situation, forced to assimilate the culture of other peoples. The old man said it: "The Jews are the blood they have spilled." [end of interview]

Rybakov is also Aronov. "Heavy Sand" is not a novel about the Soviet Jews, however, nor is it their history. Perhaps it is only an attempt to present them as a people: enough to arouse interest and polemics beyond the ordinary, another sign of their existence.

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NATIONAL

SOVIET GERMAN VILLAGE IN SIBERIA VISITED

Hamburg STERN in German 22 Feb 79 Special Supplement pp 1-7

[Article by Norbert Kuchinke: "Little Germany in Siberia"]

[Text] Podsosnovo was founded in tsarist times. Today, the village of 2,000 people, with its Schneiders, Schmidts or Kaisers, is a model kolkhoz with huge yields ("We are wallowing in plenty"). STERN reporter Kuchinke visited these "Soviet citizens of German nationality."

The breakfast table has been laid. There is vodka and wine, meat, ham, tomatoes, cucumbers. "Prost" [your health!], says Friedrich Friedrichovich Schneider; "be our guest." We raise and clink our glasses. "Nazdrovye." In a German village. In Podsosnovo--which means "under the pine trees."

We had arrived a couple of hours before, at 4 in the morning. It took 4 hours by jet from Moscow to Novosibirsk, and then half an hour by small plane to Barnaul. There we boarded a train for Slavgorod. Another 8 hours, and then a bumpy 2-hour ride by car into the Alta Mountains, to Podsosnovo. We have reached the end--the end of the world--4,000 ice-cold kilometers east of Moscow.

Friedrich Friedrichovich Schneider is the boss here. He is responsible for the 2,000 "Soviet citizens of German nationality" (their official designation) living in Podsosnovo, responsible for the Haases, the Heimbuchs, the Schmidts, the Kaisers--and the Schneiders, who alone make up 20 percent of the population.

After our arrival, Schneider, whose houseguests we will be for 5 days, allows us 3 hours' sleep. Then the village program for the West German guests begins. In the kindergarten, the neatly lined up little ones sing German and Russian folksongs and recite poems. Then, for 3 hours, youths perform on the piano, the violin and the accordion. After that an exhibition game by the local volleyball team, followed by a Western-Eastern pop concert of the local youth band.

The village is feting us, its cousins from the FRG, as if we were on a state visit. A show for the cameras? Produced in order to divert attention from the difficult situation of other Soviet Germans who want to, but are not allowed, to go to the West?

Podsosnovo Is Among the Richest Kolkhozes of the Soviet Union

The cordiality, the hospitality in Podsosnovo is genuine. The pleasure at being able to welcome Germans is as noticeable as the pride in being able to display one's life's work.

Podsosnovo is a kolkhoz, an agricultural production collective. In contrast with most kolkhozes in the USSR, which do not attain the production prescribed by Moscow--either because they are poorly administered or because their members lack true motivation of performance--this kolkhoz does well.

It does so well, in fact, that it is among the richest in the Soviet Union. And this despite the fact the steppe country is not exactly fertile. But the settlers have built sophisticated irrigation systems here and planted trees to protect the harvest from sandstorms.

Of the 7,000 sheep, the 1,300 head of cattle, the 660 arctic foxes, the 120 horses--and millions of bees and the grain they grow--the kolkhozniks, according to Schneider, "wallow in plenty."

The annual turnover of the people of Podsosnovo is 3 million rubles (9 million deutsche marks). After deducting costs, there remains more than 3 million deutsche marks. What is to be done with the "profit" is decided collectively, the villages deciding themselves whether to buy grain or cattle, erect new agricultural premises or pour out increased bonuses.

Ninety-five percent of families have their own house--sometimes with more than seven rooms. Their own homes stand on land of 5,000 square meters made available to them by the kolkhoz for an annual rent of 66 deutsche marks. A house, built without the benefit of an architect, costs the settler about 15,000 deutsche marks. Of this amount 3,000 to 6,000 deutsche marks are loaned by the kolkhozes to their members without interest over periods of 10 years or longer.

The steppe Germans of Podsosnovo live much better today than most other Soviet citizens. But that has not always been so. Three hundred years ago, Catherine II fetched their ancestors to Russia in order that they might colonize the unpopulated expanses. Many settled on the Volga, others later moved on to Siberia. There, each of them was allowed to take as much land as he was able to work. But the work was rugged as can be, with temperatures of 40 below Celsius in the winter and 40 above in the summer.

In 1902, Volga Germans founded Podsosnovo. At that time they dwelt in tents or small log cabins and hardly had anything to eat--only what they could get from nature. They went fishing and hunting. But gradually they managed to maintain themselves as farmers.

After Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, the "Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of Volga Germans" founded under Lenin was dissolved, with its population being deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan. Many took refuge in Podsosnovo. Moving in with relatives or disappearing among people with the same name, they contributed to the well-being of the kolkhoz.

The best known citizen of Podsosnovo and one of the most influential people among the 2 million Germans living in the Soviet Union today is the trained agronomist Friedrich Friedrichovich Schneider, our host. His parents came from the Volga, from the village of Tennhof. But not even Schneider knows where his ancestors lived in Germany. His slight Swabian accent indicates Swabia as the original homeland. He talks a German-Russian hotchpotch. "The Shoffera (chauffeurs) drove me" or "Dogovorilis (agreed), we will meet at noon tomorrow." The "cumrades" meet in the street. When they want to buy plane tickets, they babble: "I want tickets on a Samolet." To relax on a couch at home and watch television sounds like this: "Rest I do at home, on a divan, when I take a look in televizor."

Schneider is the undisputed boss in Podsosnovo. Shepherd Jakob Jakoblevich Igs says jokingly about his comrade who is the head of the village: "There is a god in the world, and one here in the village." The kolkhozniks also occasionally call their village "Schneiderland."

The Hero of Labor Is Better Off than Ivan, the Normal Consumer

The 52-year-old kolkhoz chairman Schneider has accomplished something only few people in the Soviet Union can ever accomplish. He is deputy of the Supreme Soviet and has been awarded the highest decoration of the worker-and-peasant state--"hero of socialist labor." The German farmers' leader got the high order, of pure gold, for "outstanding building efforts, plan fulfillment and pioneer work." A rise in the standard of living goes along with the honor. Once a year he can travel gratis by plane, ship or train to any vacation spot in the Soviet Union. He can use all municipal transport gratis and pays less for housing than Ivan, the normal consumer.

Sixty Years of Atheism--But the Bible Is Also Still Right

In contrast with other ethnic minorities of the Soviet Union, Schneider's kolkhozniks do not have a German school. The language of instruction in Russian. But from the second grade on, German is taught as a second language 4 hours a week, and from the sixth grade on 5 hours a week. Schneider is optimistic: "No one forgets the dialect here; only now we also try to learn standard German." Classrooms are decorated with quotations from great German writers suitable for a communist-ruled village--like Schiller's "I embrace you, millions" or Goethe's "Only one who has worked his whole life with body and soul can say, 'I have lived.'"

Even Walter Ulbricht, meanwhile also forgotten in the GDR, still gets his due in the German village: "Be bold in your thinking, purposeful in your work and carefree in your play."

There is no church in the village, although many inhabitants are still baptized Lutherans or Catholics. "The little old women," confesses a Lutheran," nevertheless have their church service--at home." Despite 60 years of official atheism, the Bible is still the most widely read publication among the old people.

Regardless of their faith, the Germans in Podsosnovo stick together, but they no longer have any contact with Germany. "My mother tongue is German, but the language of my country is Russian," says Johann Diesendorf, 62, who fought against the Germans, and was wounded, in the Red Army.

For young arctic fox breeder Friedrich Gustavovich Meiser, 31, who likewise has served in the Red Army, in Tashkent, Germany means hardly more than "Angliya" or "Frantsiya" (England or France), though he married a Miss Keller from the village. Boss Schneider graphically explains where one feels at home, saying: "A rabbit feels at home wherever it has its food." While the milkmaid Schneider would rather visit Germany than, say, Italy ("after all, I know the language"), no one wants to migrate to the FRG, because there are neither friends nor relatives in the West. Says Schneider: "Our Germany is here."

When the people of Podsosnovo build houses, they help their "cumrades" on weekends. Next to the houses, there are stables everywhere in which sheep, cattle, chickens and pigs are kept privately. In small greenhouses there grow "private" cucumbers, tomatoes and lettuce.

Boss Schneider May Check Any Private Savings Account

But the socialist state sees to it that in Podsosnovo too there is a limit to everything and that the industrious farmers do not get too rich. Private holdings of cattle are carefully regulated: no family can have more than 20 sheep, 3 pigs and 1 cow. Chickens, geese, bees and rabbits are not included in the state count, however.

Meat, skins and honey may be sold by the kolkhozniks at so-called free kolkhoz markets, where, as in the West, prices are regulated by supply and demand. And what they get is two or three times as much as at state purchasing establishments. Thus the self-suppliers get family incomes of up to 3,000 deutsche marks--a proud sum by Soviet standards.

The well-to-do inhabitant of Podsosnovo is also motorized above average, with 70 privately owned cars--"Moskoviches" or "Zhigulis"--negotiating highways and ice roads. "I think that if we got faster delivery of cars, every family here would have one," says Johannes Heinrichovich Heimbuch.

Boss Schneider, who has the right to check any of the savings accounts, with his monthly income of not quite 700 rubles plus 100 rubles' deputy's per diem, is not by any means the richest man in the village. Nor does he own his own home. His sole luxury is a medium-size Volga car.

Politics are of little concern to the villagers. Disputes are rare, and minor offenses are punished by collective courts with small fines. The court of jurisdiction is located in the nearest town. Schneider says: "But in our whole history, none of us has ever appeared before the court."

On their days off the people of Podsosnovo generally work on their house or in the garden or tend to their private cattle.

Big celebrations generally take place only on Soviet holidays, such as May Day or the anniversary of the October Revolution. On those occasions the multipurpose hall used for sports, cultural events and entertainment, with its more than 1,000 seats, is completely filled.

Particularly during the long winter evenings the kolkhozniks sit together in their parlors, drinking vodka and wine (as yet there is no beer, a brewery being only in the planning stage), eating pork and beef meatballs dripping with fat and singing their favorite song, "our hymn": "O beautiful Podsosnovo land, who knows if we will meet again. And when we look, when we look over the gate, over the gate, we see Podsosnovo land, and when we peep and peep through the holes, the holes, we see Podsosnovo land."

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